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Abstract 
 
The standard literature on working time has modelled the decisions of firms in a deterministic 
framework in which firms can choose between employment and overtime (given mandated standard 
hours). Contrary to this approach, we consider the impact of uncertainty and real options on the 
decision of working time, i.e. we examine the determinants of employment and hours in a stochastic 
framework. We conclude the theoretical analysis with a number of simulation exercises to illustrate 
the working of the model. 
 
 
Acknowledgement 
 
We would like to thank Giuseppe Bertola (European University Institute, Florence) and Bob Hart 
(Stirling University) for helpful commmets on an earlier draft. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Real Options, Uncertainty, Working Time, Employment, Labor Demand 
JEL-Classification: D81, E24, J23 
 
 2 
I. Introduction 
 
The persistence of high unemployment, and the rise of non-employment for some groups such as 
older males, in various European countries has reignited academic and political debate over work 
sharing by legislated reduction of the standard working week. Thus a 35 hour week has been enacted 
in France for firms with over 20 employees, and other firms must follow suit within two years. A 
similar legislation is pending in Italy [OECD (1998)]. In Germany, the largest union for the metal 
working industry (IG Metall) has recently even asked for a 32 hour week agreement. Similar 
programs are envisaged in other European countries, which hope that hours reductions will be an 
efficient policy for reducing unemployment. The basic intuition underlying these suggestions is that 
reducing standard hours per employee would encourage firms to hire additional employees as they 
seek to replace the labour services currently provided by those employees putting in longer hours. 
Such measures remain controversial, and the earlier studies of employment effects of working time 
reduction summarized by Hart (1987) and Calmfors and Hoel (1988, 1989) were inconclusive but 
generally sceptical. 1  On the other hand, a number of more recent theoretical studies by Houpis 
(1993), and Contensou and Vranceanu (2000), FitzRoy et al. (2002), and Marimon and Zilibotti 
(2000) tend to be somewhat more optimistic, while the OECD (1998) has emphasized the importance 
of measures that would complement working time reduction to encourage job creation. 
A common feature of these studies on working time is that the decisions of firms are modelled in a 
deterministic framework in which firms can choose between employment and overtime (given 
mandated standard hours). An exogenous reduction of standard hours then leads to an ambiguous 
employment effect depending upon the overtime premium and other parameters of the model. 
However, these traditional approaches do not consider the impact of uncertainty and real options on 
the decision of working time. Given these employment policy debates, the paper tries to consider one 
of the most recent developments of the literature on investment theory to model the determinants of 
employment and hours of work. In other words, we would like to use the theory of real options to 
model the use of overtime adjustment in relation to employment adjustment. 
The general idea behind the so-called theory of real options is that each investment project can be 
assimilated, in its nature, to the purchase of a financial call option, where the investor pays a 
premium price in order to get the right to buy an asset for some time at a predetermined price 
(exercise price), and eventually different from the spot market price of the asset (strike price).2 
Analogously, the firm, in its investment decision, pays a price (the cost of setting up the project) 
which gives her the right to use the capital (exercise price), now or in the future, in return for an asset 
worth a strike price. Taking into account this approach, the calculus of profitability of each single 
                                                                 
1 A thorough review of the literature can be found in OECD (1998), pp. 117-148. Many labor economists have 
derided the idea of the 35-hour work week to reduce unemployment as the "lump -of-labour fallacy". 
2 The use of real option theory to analyse factor demand decisions under uncertainty has become increasingly 
popular. See, for example, Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Coy (1999). 
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investment project cannot be done simply applying the net present value rule to the expected future 
cash flows of the operation, but has rather to consider the following three characteristics of the 
investment decision: 
1. there is uncertainty  about future rewards from the investment; 
2. there is some leeway about the timing of the investment and 
3. the investment is partially or complete irreversible. 
The first characteristic of the investment decision derives from the fact that the investors have no 
perfect information. As a result they form expectations and beliefs on the future behaviour of the 
economic variables which cannot be predicted with certainty. The second characteristic is directly 
related to the uncertainty: investors might want to postpone their investment from period t to period 
t+1 in order to get more information, refine their beliefs and reduce uncertainty. This of course 
entails an opportunity cost of waiting in terms of missed opportunities, should the economic 
variables in period t+1 be such that the investor would have made profits had the investment been 
undertaken at time t. Finally, the investor has to take into account the fact that the initial cost of the 
investment is at least partially sunk, i.e. he or she cannot recover it all should he or she change his 
mind after the investment has been undertaken. As a result, the weight of the uncertainty in the 
determination of the net present value is higher the higher is the sunk cost of the investment. The 
novel aspect of this paper is to apply the real option theory to the case of employment and hours 
determination, i.e. we intend to model overtime hours combined with firing and hiring costs as a 
rational response of firms to an uncertain environment. In particular, we distinguish between altering 
labour input along the extensive and intensive margins, and accordingly decompose labour input into 
an employment decision – the extensive margin – and hours worked per worker – the intensive 
margin. This takes a step towards providing a satisfactory framework which can be used to analyse 
and clarify some of the policy debates and empirical regularities evidenced above.3   
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section II begins by laying out the basis 
analytical framework, and show how employment policies and timing can be treated as an optimal 
stopping problem. The results from model calibrations are presented in the succeeding section III. 
We conclude in section IV by discussing the implications of our results for the worksharing and 
employment protection debate and offer suggestions for future research. 
 
                                                                 
3 In related work, Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Bertola (1990), Bell (1996), Chen and Zoega (1999) and Booth 
et al. (2001) have used similar modelling frameworks. None of these papers, however, has focused on standard 
hours and overtime. Our approach will therefore reduce the bias that may arise through failure to control for 
the endogeneity of overtime hours. 
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II. The Theory of the Firm 
 
A. The Cobb-Douglas Case  
 
In order to get at the basic issues and obtain results that are reasonably easy to interpret, we introduce 
a real options model in a simple  a way as possible. The main objective in specifying the technology 
is to model the basic trade-offs which firms are faces in deciding upon the working hours of its 
employees, and the number of employees to hire. For the sake of analytical convenience, the 
production function of the representative firm in terms of value added is denoted by the Cobb-
Douglas production function 
 
(1) ( )( ) aa -= 1HNgKY , 
 
where H actual hours, N employment level, x the fixed costs of employment, Hs is standard contract 
hours. The capital stock K is taken as given at any point in time, giving rise to strict concavity of the 
production function. We also abstract from changes in the utilisation of capital. It is still noteworthy 
that economic theory has not still reached an unanimous consensus on the sign of the relationship 
between overtime hours worked and uncertainty. While it seems natural for the average person on 
the street to think that higher demand uncertainty means less employment and more overtime, results 
from theoretical models critically depend upon hypotheses made regarding agent´s preferences, 
market regimes, and the type of production technology adopted by firms. It is well known that within 
standard factor demand models factor demand and uncertainty are positively correlated. This result 
depends upon the convexity of the firm´s profit function with respect to the stochastic variable, 
usually the output price. Caballero (1991) has demonstrated that irreversibility by itself (or 
asymmetric adjustment costs) is not sufficient in order to obtain a negative relationship between 
factor demand and uncertainty. Other hypotheses on the relationship between current and future 
employment should also be considered as, for instance, the presence of imperfect competition or 
decreasing returns to scale.4 The positive relationship between factor demand and price uncertainty is 
at odds with what seems to occur in the real world, where the media often report the concern of 
entrepreneurs and public authorities of the negative effects of uncertainty on project returns and, 
therefore, on the willingness to expand capacity. In this section and the next, we therefore allow for 
imperfect competition, i.e. we assume that the firm faces an isoelastic demand function where p and 
Y denote the price and the output, respectively [See Abel and Eberly (1994)]. 
  
(2) ( ) ZYp yy-= 1 ,  y ³ 1, 
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where Z denotes the demand shock, and y is an elasticity parameter that takes its minimum value of 
1 under perfect competition. Therefore, current profits, measured in units of output, are defined as, 
  
(3) ( )( ) ( )[ ]NxHwHNgZK +-=P 21 aa  
 
where yaa =1  and ( ) yaa -= 12 , w hourly wages, and x the fixed costs of employment. It is 
important to note that x (for example, work space for the workers) is interpreted as a flow in (4). The 
existence of fixed costs per worker x tends to make firms want higher hours in order to spread these 
costs over more hours of work.5 Risk-neutral firm chooses actual hours and employment to maximise 
its expected discounted value of profits. The firm’s expected value of discouted profits without any 
firing and/or hiring costs is 
 
(4) ( )( ) ( )[ ][ ]ò¥ -+-=
0,
21max dseNxHwHNgZKV rs
HN
aa , 
 
where r is the real rate of interest. According to equation (4), firms choose how many people to 
employ, and the specific number of hours, given the wage schedule. It is assumed that workers never 
quit and the demand factor Z follows the geometric Brownian motion 
 
(5) vsh ZdZdtdZ +=  
 
where v  is a Wiener process; dtd ev =  (since e is a normally distributed random variable with 
mean zero and a standard deviation of unity), h is the drift parameter and s the variance parameter. 
Thus, we have an optimal stopping problem – we must determine when it is optimal to hire or fire 
workers, given the stochatic evolution of Z. Using Itô's Lemma, the Bellman equation for the value 
V  at time zero, in the continuation region is 
   
(6) ( )( ) ( )[ ]
þ
ý
ü
î
í
ì +++-= ZZZ
HN
VZZVNxHwHNgZKrV 22
, 2
1
 max 21 shaa  
 
The first term on the right-hand side is revenue, ( )[ ]NxHw + is the employment-related bill, hZVZ   is 
the gain due to demand growth, and the last term is the change in the value of the firm caused by 
changes in demand. The  first-order conditions for H is: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
4 See Zeira (1987) on the role played by imperfectly competitive markets. 
5 We consider the hourly wage to be exogenous because union models such as those of Calmfors (1985) 
indicate that the direction of the wage change is ambiguous when standard hours are cut. Another reason is the 
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(7) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0''12 221 =-- NHwHgHgNZK aaaa  
 
After solving equation (7), the variable H become a function of Z given the functions of w and g. 
Note that since Z follows a stochastic process, the values of Z in hiring and firing decisions should be 
different in (7). To find the optimal condition for employees with the existence of firing costs and 
hiring costs, we need to obtain the value of the marginal employed worker first ( )NVv =  and then 
compare the marginal value of employees with the marginal hir ing costs and firing costs. We take 
the derivative of (6) with respect to N 
 
(8) ( ) ( )[ ] ZZZ vZZvxHwHgNZKrv 2212 2
1
 221 sha aaa +++-= -  
 
where NVv =  is the value of employing the marginal worker. The solution for ( )Zv  consists of the 
particular integral and the complementary function. We first deal with identification of uncertainty 
effects in the very special case where hiring and firing costs are zero. This special case turns out to 
be useful as a starting point and for comparisons. Then we turn to the general case with positive 
hiring and firing costs. In the absence of hiring and firing costs, the particular integral may be 
expressed as 
  
(9) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ][ ] úû
ù
êë
é +-= ò
¥
--
0
1
2
221 dsezHwHgNZKEZv rsP aaaa  
 
which is the expected present value of the marginal employed worker. This integral can be rewritten 
as 
 
(10) ( ) ( ) ( )
r
zHw
r
HgNZK
Zv P
+
-
-
=
-
h
a aaa 221 12  
 
The firm’s option value of hiring in the future and its option value of firing once the worker is 
employed are measured by the complementary function: 
  
(11) ZZZ vZZvrv
22
2
1sh +=  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
existing evidence that unions involved in worksharing have successfully campaigned for increases in the 
hourly wage to "compensate" for the hours lost.  
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Letting vG  be the value of the option, the general solutions for the hiring and firing options have the 
following forms, respectively, 
 
(12) ( ) 11 bZAZvGT =  
 
and 
 
(13) ( ) 22 bZAZvGF =  
 
where b1 and b2 are the positive and negative roots of the following characteristic equation: 
 
(14) ( ) 01
2
1 2 =-+- rhbbbs  
 
To satisfy the boundary conditions that ( ) 00 =GTv  and ( )¥GFv  = 0, we use the positive solution for 
vH
G  and the negative solution for vF
G
.  
We now add fixed hiring (T) and firing (F) costs to the model with both T and F being payable by 
the firm. 6 When there are fixed costs of either hiring or firing, the firm will consider the option value 
of maintaining her current position against the alternative of hiring or firing. The value of the 
marginal, employed worker is equal to the sum of v P  and vF
G  in the continuation region. In order to 
derive the two thresholds for hiring and firing, we then compare the value of the worker to the direct 
and indirect costs of hiring (firing) the workers. The definitions of the hiring and firing barriers, 
FT ZZ  and , are given by the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions below. It is 
straightforward to show that according to the value-matching conditions the firm would find it 
optimal to exercise its option to hire or fire the marginal worker once Z hits one of the two barriers: 
 
(15) 
( ) ( )
12
221
12
1
2 bb
aaa
h
a
TT
T ZATZA
r
xHw
r
HgNKZ
+=+
+
-
-
-
 
 
and 
 
(16) 
( ) ( )
21
221
21
1
2 bb
aaa
h
a
FF
F ZAFZA
r
xHw
r
HgNKZ
+=+
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é +
-
-
-
-
 
                                                                 
6 T can be thought of as representing the screening and training costs associated with the recruitment of a new 
employee and F as the severance costs imposed by legislation when dismissing an employee. 
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The left-hand sides of (15) and (16) show the marginal benefit from hiring/firing a worker and the 
right-hand sides the corresponding marginal costs. The marginal benefit of hiring a worker is equal 
to the sum of the present discounted value of his productivity net of wages and the value of the 
option to fire him. The firm’s ability to fire raises the benefit from employing a worker. The 
marginal cost of hiring is the sum of the direct hiring costs and the sacrificed option to hire him in 
the future. By hiring a worker today, the opportunity to do so in the future – when conditions may be 
more favourable – is sacrificed. Similarly, by firing a worker, the opportunity to do so in the future – 
when demand conditions may be even more adverse – is sacrificed, and the opportunity to hire him 
again is gained. The value of the two options depends on expectations about changes in demand. The 
option to hire is valuable if firms expect demand to increase in the future, while the option to fire is 
the more important if they expect it to fall. The smooth-pasting conditions ensure that hiring (firing) 
is not optimal either before nor after the hiring (firing) threshold is reached. In technical terms, this 
means: 
 
(17) 
( ) 1
11
1
22
1
2 12
221
--
-
=+
-
bb
aaa
bb
h
a
TT ZAZAr
HgNK
 
 
and 
 
(18) 
( ) 1
22
1
11
1
2 21
221
--
-
=+
-
- bb
aaa
bb
h
a
FF ZAZAr
HgNK
. 
 
Equations (15) - (18) form a non-linear system of equations with four unknown parameters, 
21  and , , Z, AAZ FT , and can be solved for numerically once the solutions for b1 and b2 are obtained 
from (14) and optimal values for H are found for the the values of FT ZZ  and  via equation (7): 
 
(18) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0''1 1 =-- -- NHwHgHgNKZT aaaa  
 
and 
 
(20) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0''1 1 =-- -- NHwHgHgNKZF aaaa . 
 
In order to calculate the thresholds for hiring (ZT) and firing (ZF) a marginal worker, we have to 
select a functional form for g(H) and w(H). Following Hart (1987) and Santamäki (1984) we model 
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labour services as a piece-wise continuous and nonlinear function of mandated standard hours Hs and 
actual hours worked H: 
 
(21) 
( )
ïî
ï
í
ì
£
>
=
HHH
HHHH sHHg
s
ss
g
dg /
)(  
 
Standard contract hours are exogenously given to the firm which determines actual hours as a control 
variable besides employment.7 Following the literature we assume that 0 < d < 1 so that g(H) is 
strictly concave and the problem of the firm is well defined. An exogenous reduction of Hs may 
increase or decrease g(H) and – depending on the overtime wage premium – increase or decrease 
employment and labor services. Following Hart (1987) we introduce a piece-wise linear wage 
equation 
 
(22) 
( )
ïî
ï
í
ì
£
>+
=
-
HHHws
HHHH sawHwsHw
s
sss)(  
 
according to which firms pay a constant premium a > 1 on overtime hours (H – Hs).8 In other words, 
a is the legally determined multiple of the standard wage ws paid for regular hours. Equations (3) and 
(22) imply that we allow for quasi-fixed labour costs and wage schedules that are increasing in hours 
worked. The corresponding thresholds for hours (HT and HF, respectively) can be calculated in a 
similar way. It should be evident that the hiring and firing policy of the optimising firm is 
discontinuous. In some periods the the optimal strategy of the firm will be to adjust hours of work. 
Under other demand conditions will be to fire or hire. More specifically, employment inaction will 
always be chosen when deviations of the expected marginal product of labour from the optimal level 
do not justify the costs of employment adjustment. In such situations, the firm prefers to adjust the 
actual hours of work, i.e. overtime work provides "flexibility at the margin". Adjustments to the 
workforce (hirings or firings) will only be observed when deviations in the expected marginal 
revenue product of labour from the optimal level are large enough to compensate for the hiring and 
firing costs. In other words, hiring and firing costs generate a corridor of inaction within which firms 
do not change their workforce. This region is identified by the upper, ZT, and lower, ZF, control 
barrier. The cyclical implications of this no action corridor are clear; firing costs increase 
employment in thoughs and reduce employment in peaks. But it is unclear what the effects are on the 
average employment level. Bentolilia nad Bertola (1990) find in their model that firing costs actually 
                                                                 
7 HS is best interpreted as standard hours either set by the government or, more realistically, determined in the 
bargaining between firms and unions beyond which an overtime premium must be paid. 
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increase average employment since the effect that they prevent firings dominates the effect from 
lower hiring. The question is whether or not this result is born out in our more general model 
allowing for overtime.  
To determine the optimal labour demand policy of the firm one therefore needs to identify this no-
action region, this involves calculating the optimal upper and lower control barriers as functions of 
the parameters of the model. There are no closed-form solutions to the model, but the real-options 
approach allows us to analyse changes in hiring and firing costs, changes in the overtime premium, 
and the implications of higher (lower) demand uncertainty (mean-preserving spreads) in numerical 
simulations.  
 
B. The CES Case 
 
Until now we have considered the case of a Cobb-Douglas technology with a unitary substitution 
elasticity. Below we analyse the role of the substitution elasticity. In the analysis of this issue we 
replace (1) with a more general three factor CES production function which has the form 
 
(23) ( ) ( )[ ] mmm qqqq 11 ---- --++= NHgKY HKHuK  
 
where -1 < m < ¥ is the substitution parameter (m ¹ 0), and 1,0 << HK qq  are  the distribution 
parameters, H actual working hours, K is the captial stock and N is the number of employees. In (23) 
the elasticity of substitution is given by b = 1/(1+m). In equation (23) we have assumed constant 
returns to scale.9 The implicit demand function is again given by (2). Therefore, current profits are 
given by 
  
(24) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]NxHwNHgKZ HKHK +---++=P
-
--- mymmm qqqq
1
1  
 
The firm chooses sequences { }H tN t t, 0¥= which solve the following optimisation problem: 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
8 The overtime hours wages typically exceed the wages of standard hours although empirical evidence shows 
that this is not always the case, and sometimes there is even no compensation for overtime work. See, for 
instance, Trejo (1993) and Pannenberg and Wagner (2001). 
9  It is apparent that the three-factor CES function is written in a "symmetrical" way for expositional 
convenience. In other words, there is no differential pattern of complementarity. Different degrees of 
complementarities are easiest to analyse in terms of a two -level CES function in which two factors (for 
example, H and N) are nested together in a subaggregate input X using one value of m and then X and K are 
entered into the main production function with a different and lower m. Krusell et al. (2000) have recently used 
a similar specification for four inputs.   
 11 
(25) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]ò¥ -
-
---
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
+---++=
0
1
,
1max dseNxHwNHgKZV rsHKHK
HN
mymmm qqqq  
 
where r is the real rate of interest. It is assumed that workers never quit and the demand factor Z 
follows a geometric Brownian motion. Thus, the Bellman equation for the value V at time zero, in 
the continuation region is   
 
(26) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]
ïþ
ï
ý
ü
ïî
ï
í
ì
+++---++=
-
---
ZZZHKHKHN
VZZVNxHwNHgKZrV 22
1
, 2
1 1max shqqqq mymmm   
 
It is straightforward to see that the first-order condit ion for H is 
 
(27) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) 0'1' 1
1
1 =---++
-
-
----- NHwNHgKHgHZg HKHK
H mymmmm qqqq
y
q . 
 
The shadow price of employees is represented by the equation 
 
(28)    ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ZZZHKHHK vZZvxHwNHgKZNrv 221
1
1
2
1
 1
1
shqqqq
y
qq
mymmmm +++---++
--
=
-
-
-----       
 
where NVv =  is the value of employing the marginal worker. The particular solution is  
 
(29) ( )
( ) ( )[ ]
( )
r
zHw
r
NHgKZN
Zv
HKHK
NK
P +-
-
--++
--
=
-
-
-----
h
qqqq
y
qq
mymmmm
1
1
1 1
1
  
 
The homogeneous solutions are the same as in equations (12) and (13). It remains to impose the 
value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions. When these conditions are imposed, we obtain the 
following system of equations for the hiring and firing thresholds in the CES case: 
 
(30) 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) 12
12
1
1
1 1
1
bb
mymmmm
h
qqq
y
qq
TT
HKT
HK
ZATZA
r
xHw
r
NHgKNZ
+=+
+
-
-
-++
-- -------
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(31) 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )
21
21
1
1
1 1
1
bb
mymmmm
h
qqq
y
qq
FF
HF
HK
ZAFZA
r
xHw
r
NHgKNZ
+=+
ú
ú
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ê
ê
ë
é
+
-
-
-++
--
-
-
-
-----
 
 
(32) 
( ) ( )[ ]
1
11
1
22
1
1
1
12
1
1
--
-
-
-----
=+
-
-++
--
bb
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bb
h
qqq
y
qq
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r
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(33) 
( ) ( )[ ]
1
22
1
11
1
1
1
21
1
1
--
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-
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-
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FF
HK
HK
ZAZA
r
NHgKN
 
 
Equation (30) – (33) are a straightforward generalisation of equation (15) – (18) for the Cobb-
Douglas production function. In our intertemporal context, the firm´s forward-looking behaviour 
again anticipates future demand shocks, modifying employment policy for any particular period. The 
g(H) and wage function are determined by equations (21) and (22) provided earlier. Again, the 
corresponding thresholds for hours (HT and HF, respectively) can be calculated in a similar way. It is 
reassuring to know that the results of Section II can be replicated using a more realistic, but more 
cumbersome, apparatus. Having established this, we now turn to numerical simulations. 
 
III. Numerical Simulations  
 
The preceding section has laid out the model economy. Having illustrated that the stochastic 
framework has important ramifications for the dynamic behaviour of employment, we proceed in 
this section to use the theoretical models derived above to carry out a number of comparative static 
analyses to shed light on the workings of the models and the economic forces at work. For this 
reason, the models are calibrated in order to match characteristics of the German economy. The use 
of consensus estimates ensures that the calibration is based on the best up-to-date knowledge in the 
literature. In this way, applied economic modelling is likely to increase the credibility of policy 
analysis. 
The unit time length corresponds to one year. Our base parameters are s = 0.12, h = 0.0, K = 1, HS = 
1, x = 0.45, T = 0.1, F = 0.6, Y = 1.5, r = 0.08, m = 0.4825, a = 0.3, qK = 0.333, qH = 0.333, wS = 1, a 
= 1.5, d = g = 0.9. Where possible, parameter values are drawn from empirical labour studies. The 
firing and hiring parameters are consistent with those in Bertolila and Bertola (1990) for Germany. 
Their estimated firing costs for Germany are in the range 0.562 £ F £ 0.750 and their hiring cost 
estimate (excluding on-the-job-training) for Germany is 0.066 of the average annual wage. Our 
specification (T = 0.10) is also broadly consistent with the recruiting and training cost of two months 
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in Mortenson and Pissarides´ (1999) calibration. They suggest that this number is consistent with 
survey results reported in Hamermesh (1993). The substitution elasticity b = 1/(1+m) = 0.7 has been 
taken from Pissarides (1998). Hart (1984) documents that the share of quasi-fixed costs in labour 
costs is non-negligible. In line with Hart and Kawasaki (1988), we set x = 0.45. The overtime wage a 
= 1.5 is consistent with most German bargaining agreements and therefore a reasonable 
approximation to reality [see, for example, Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) and Trejo (1993)]. 
Finally, the price elasticity of demand parameter is set at Y = 1.50 as in Bovenberg et al. (1998). The 
determination of some parameters, however, requires the use of judgement, i.e. they reflect a back-
of-the-envelope calculation. 10 
We conduct various experiments to investigate the effects uncertainty and/or policy variables upon 
employment and hours of work. First, we consider a policy which changes hiring and firing (layoff) 
costs.11 Despite the fact that liberalisation of labour markets has ranked highly in European policy 
debates, few effective changes to the stringent nature of the employment constraints facing European 
firms appear to have been implemented over the last decade. Moreover, in a number of European 
countries the general trend towards greater employment protection would actually appear to have 
continued. 12 The results for alternative hiring and firing costs are given in Figure 1 and 2 below. 
Figure 1 presents the employment and hour thresholds for b = 1 (the Cobb-Douglas production 
function), while Figure 2 gives the optimal responses of a firm for b = 0.7 (the CES production 
function). In other words, Figure 1 - 2 report on the sensitivity of the calibration results to the 
specific production function used. The major results of the calibrations are that higher hiring and 
firing costs lead to an increase of the no action area, i.e. increasing hiring and/or firing increases the 
hiring threshold and decreases the firing threshold.13 The net impact upon employment turns out to 
be negative because the hiring thresholds are steeper, compared to the firing ones. The economic 
intuition for this result is the following. An increase in T has a direct effect on ZT so that firms raise 
working hours (HZ) and then increase ZT. An increase in F leads to a reduction in firing options in ZT 
                                                                 
10 Note, however, that the goal of this paper is not to derive precise quantitative estimates of the impact of 
various labour market regulations, but rather to illustrate the qualitative predictions of a partial equilibrium 
model and to identify key features of the framework in determining the policy´s quantitative impact. 
11 The numerical boundary value problem is solved with the method of Newton-Raphson for nonlinear systems. 
A description of the numerical programming technique is provided in Press et al. (2002). 
12  One example is the recent French government´s remedy to introduce tighter labour laws. Assuming a 
company is not confronted by impossible circumstances or by irresistible technological change, it can 
announce redundancies only after all other means have been tried to preserve jobs. Moreover, it will have to 
negotiate with a work council authorised to offer other solutions and, if deadlock ensures, submit to the 
arbitration of a government-approved mediator. On the contrary, the Italian government is determined to alter 
Article 18 of the „worker statue“ dating from the 1970s. It requires employers to reinstate (not just comp ensate) 
workers whose dismissal is ruled unjust by the courts. Italian law goes further than any other in Europe in this 
respect and therefore is a deadweight on business.  
13 The area of inaction exists because hiring and/or firing decisions are rarely a now-or-never decisions. In 
most cases, it is feasible to delay action and wait for new information, or at least begin with decisions that are 
limited in their scope and impact. Additionally it is important to note that the two optimal trigger functions 
interact., i.e. firing costs affect the value of the hiring trigger point. The reason is that higher firing costs make 
firms more cautious about hiring. Similarily, increasing hiring costs will increase the value of the firing trigger 
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and therefore firms turn to raise the working time (HZ) and hence increase ZT. This is an additional 
indirect effect which explains why the hiring thresholds are steeper, compared to the firing ones. 
Another interesting feature is that H is smaller than HS = 1 for very large firing costs. In other words, 
when firing costs are very high, short-time work (a partial layout) turns out to be attractive for firms. 
How does the CES-model, with its greater realism, modify the conclusion of the CD-case? 
Surprisingly, barely at all, as far as its qualitative employment properties are concerned. The 
widening of the no action corridor has important policy implications because it implies that demand 
can fluctuate much more without leading to changes in employment. This may explain why ceteris 
paribus unemployment is rather persistent in Europe and why firms in Europe are more reluctant to 
increase employment during business cycle upswings compared to the United States. Furthermore 
the modelling approach offers an explanation for the differences in employment across EU member 
countries with different employment protection legislation. 14  Finally, reducing firing costs would 
assist job seekers in getting a foot into the labour market – especially those who would otherwise 
have little chance to do so: young, low-skilled, foreign and long-term unemployed. Reforms which 
aim to deregulate the existing labour law, for example by allowing for more temporary contracts 
would serve as a bridge to permanent employment by offering firms a trial period in an uncertain 
environment. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
point. This result is consistent with the stylized fact that in Germany a bigger proportion of skilled workers 
work overtime than unskilled workers [Bauer and Zimmermann (1999)]. 
14  Nicoletti et al. (1999), pp. 40-50 have presented a database on indicators of employment protection 
legislation in the OECD countries as well as a methodology for aggregating these detailed indicators into 
summary indicators of the strictness of regulations. 
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Figure 1: The Employment (ZT and ZF) and Hours (HT and HF) Thresholds for Alternative 
Hiring and Firing Costs and b = 1 (Cobb-Douglas Production Function)  
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Figure 2: The Employment (ZT and ZF) and Hours (HT and HF) Thresholds for Alternative 
Hiring and Firing Costs and b = 0.7 (CES production function)  
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Second, we consider a policy which restricts the standard hours of all employees. In countries where 
unemployment (about 4 million in Germany) is seen as a national emergency, cutting working hours 
is becoming a popular solution. Germany´s most powerful trade union, IG Metall, is campaigning to 
cut the work week from 35 hours to 32 hours. How many jobs will be created by such a policy? The 
numerical results in Figure 3 for the CES production function and our baseline parameters indicate 
that a reduction of HS below 1 leads to a widening of the no-action-area. Again the effects are 
intuitively obvious. A cut in HS is qualitatively the same as an increase in fixed costs per worker, x. 
For given output, the marginal cost of an employee (the so-called extensive margin) rises but the 
marginal cost of an overtime hour (the intensive margin) remains constant, and so the firm 
substitutes away from employment towards hours.15 These results provide a warning about some 
potential, perhaps unforeseen, effects of a mandatory hours restriction. A reduction in standard hours 
not only leads to a decline in employment, but also results in an increase of overtime. In other words, 
the 35-hour week looks like a Trojan horse.16  
 
Figure 3: The Impact of a Reduction of Standard Hours (HS) upon the  
Employment (ZT and ZH) and Hours (HT and HF) Thresholds  
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15 The fact that the firm varies labour utilisation because of high costs of labour adjustment, begs the question 
of workers willingness to incur the costs of short-term income variation and/or leisure variation. In other words, 
there are costs on both margins since deviations of marginal products from optimal levels can occur on both 
extensive and intensive labour margins. Our demand side approach may be argued to bias cost considerations 
towards the extensive margin. In effect the hiring and firing margins on the extensive margin may be matched 
by upper and lower thresholds of working time within the union´s utility function. For example, at the trough 
of the cycle, the firm may not be able to cut paid-for weekly hours as much as actual weekly hours because of 
the union´s reservation utility constraint. Adding this feature would require a general equilibrium approach. 
16 This result is consistent with a survey among 1074 employees in western and eastern Germany. It shows that 
just 33 percent of all employees and 19 percent of full-time employees wish to work less than 35 hours per 
week. 53 percent of all employees complain that previous reduction of working hours have increased overtime 
work. See Schnabel (1997). 
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In Figure 4 we plot the firm´s optimal thresholds for different overtime premiums for the CES 
production function and our baseline parameters. The results indicate that a (an) decrease (increase) 
of the overtime premium leads to a widening (shrinking) of the no-action-area. For a ³ 1.60 firms do 
not ask workers to work overtime when demand conditions are relatively buoyant because it is not 
profitable any more. The reason why the width of the band depends upon a is again fairly 
straightforward. When the overtime premium increases (decreases), the option value of hiring a new 
worker increases (decreases), the hiring cutoff decreases (increases), and firms hire more (less).17 
Another interesting feature of the simulation results which emerges from Figure 4 is that a has an 
asymmetric impact on the optimal employment and hours trigger points. More specifically, when the 
firms are confronted with lower overtime premiums, the hiring thresholds show a much more 
pronounced increase.  
 
                                                                 
17 These numerical results imply that various recent flexible working deals between German firms and unions 
will have detrimental effects upon employment. These new „productivity deals“ typically require workers to 
forgo overtime pay and some bonuses, and to work extra hours when there is a big order-book, in return for 
paid time off when things are slack. Their basic pay is guaranteed at all times. 
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Figure 4: The Impact of the Overtime Premium (a) upon the Employment (ZT and ZH) and 
Hours (HT and HF) Thresholds  
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Next we compute thresholds for different values of the standard deviation, s Î [0.08, 0.18]. The 
results are reported in Figure 5 below. Recall from section II that uncertainty enters into our model 
through changes in the evolution of demand strength, which is assumed to evolve according to a 
Brownian motion stochastic process.18 
 
                                                                 
18  In fact, the theory of real options defines in detail an economic model in which the variables directly 
affecting the information set of the firm are crucial. When this framework is applied to the employment issue, 
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Figure 5: The Impact of Uncertainty upon the Employment (ZT and ZH) 
and Hours (HT and HF) Thresholds  
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The results in Figure 5 indicate that the intertemporally optimising employer merely perceives there 
to be the possibility of a change in demand at some point in the future having an impact upon 
optimal employment. When firms perceive prevailing demand conditions to be transitory, in the 
sense that there are more frequent changes, then firms are more reluctant to to hire or fire workers, 
i.e. a larger s will lead to a considerable widening of the no-action corridor. Conversely, smaller 
values of s results in a shrinking of the width of the corridor. In an increasingly transitory economic 
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
the crucial variables responsible for the undertaking of hirings (firings) are likely to be those capable of 
sending a signal that reduces (increases) the level of uncertainty of the firm. 
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environment (increasing s) the optimal employment strategy also implies a higher level of hours 
over the business cycle. In other words, firms opt for a wait and learn attitude in order to lower its 
degree of uncertainty. 
In order to compare our results to those reported in Bentolila and Bertola (1990), we finally compare our 
results for the CES production function and our baseline parameters with the corresponding no overtime 
working case. The value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions for no overtime working. are 
determined as follows. Since there are no overtime working and wage premium, we have  
 
(34) ( ) gSHHg =  
 
(35) ( ) SS HwHw =  
 
The value-matching conditions of equations (15) and (16) in the text become 
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and the smooth-pasting conditions become 
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Now we can simulate the model with and without overtime. The optimal trigger points under our 
assumption that firms can ask workers to work overtime with the hypothetical no-overtime case are 
given in Figure 6 below. 
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Figure 6: The Impact of Uncertainty upon the Employment Thresholds (ZT and ZH) 
in the Overtime and in the No Overtime Case 
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The graphs examine the direction and the magnitude of the bias which may arise though failure to 
control for endogenous variations in hours worked. The results indicate that demand fluctuates 
considerably more in our analysis than in the Bentolila and Bertola (1990) framework without 
warranting changes in employment because because firms can ask workers to work overtime when 
demand conditions are relatively buoyant. The results therefore indicate that particular care must be 
taken to ensure that misspecification of hours worked does not yield spurious estimates of the 
employment effects of firing and hiring costs and worksharing arrangements.19 
 
IV. Summary and Discussion 
 
In this paper it has been proven that the theory of real options when applied to the case of 
employment and working time determination can be a fruitful extension of the traditional 
deterministic framework since it is able to combine consistently the existing interactions between 
irreversibility, uncertainty and the choice of timing, all peculiar characteristics of an employment 
decision. It can therefore be concluded that new theories of employment have to rest upon an 
approach, a sort of new agenda for modelling employment and hours of work stressing dynamic 
issues such as uncertainty, market volatility and the expectations and beliefs of firms. 20 While we 
                                                                 
19 The comparison of both regimes indicates that higher F and T also leads to a more pronounced increase of 
the width of the no action corridor. 
20  One should, however, be aware that, notwithstanding this refinement, the theoretical framework above 
cannot be taken as a general tool of interpretation of the complex and multifaceted phenomenon of 
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have not formally tested the forward-looking model under uncertainty, we have sketched how its 
predictions might be consistent with aggregate data. One qualitative result was that any reduction in 
hiring and firing costs acts as a signal able to lower the uncertainty of the firms, increasing the 
opportunity cost of waiting and therefore fostering the undertaking of hiring and/or firing decisions. 
Another interesting result is that reductions of weekly standard hours have but small employment 
effects. Nevertheless, German trade unions still propose such a strategy for reducing unemployment. 
Our results suggest that in order to overcome Germany´s massive employment problems, defensive 
reductions of working hours should be replaced by offensive strategies for increasing labour market 
flexibility and stimulating economic growth. 
Before finishing we note a few caveats. First, the paper has focused on the effects of an hours 
restriction on labour demand decisions, and abstracts from numerous potentially important labour 
supply considerations. Second, we have not introduced heterogeneity into the analysis, i.e. we have 
not considered a skill mismatch between the skill characteristics of the employed and the 
unemployed. Third, we have not considered fixed-term contracts which give employers the 
opportunity to dismiss a worker with low firing costs when the contract expires. Finally, general 
equilibrium considerations are absent. We leave these extensions for future research.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
employment and hours of work. The theoretical analysis reveals in fact that a thorough specification of the 
patterns of employment additionally has to take into account the sectoral specificity and peculiar firm-level 
characteristics and strategies as additional "layers" of the firms´ final employment decision. Finally, we have 
not considered „open-ended“ contracts with stringent employment protection provisions versus temporary 
employment contracts which may serve as a partial substitute for hours variations. Temporary jobs carry no 
firing costs but entail high separation rates and therefore force the firm to engage frequently in search for new 
workers, a cost that has to be weighted against the advantage of low firing costs. Clearly, a future line of 
research is linked to the incorporation of this set of signals into the underlying technology. 
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